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Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education
Home instruction as a means of satisfying a state's compulsory education
requirements often results from parental dissatisfaction with public school sys-
tems. It has been estimated that thirty thousand families in the United States
now instruct their children in their homes.1 Parents opt to teach their children
at home for a variety of reasons. Some parents "see the public school, or pub-
licly approved private schools, as too traditional or conservative."' 2 Other par-
ents choose to educate their children at home because they are concerned about
a "general moral breakdown in the public schools and the lack of religious val-
ues in public education."' 3 Advocates of alternatives to public educational insti-
tutions contend that the quality of public schools is generally very poor.
4
Parents opposed to public education "share a common disenchantment with the
1. See Lines, Private Education Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 189, 192 &
n.10 (1983); Ward, What Happens When Parents Turn Teachers, N.Y. Times Winter Survey of Edu-
cation, Jan. 10, 1982, § 13, at 3. Other estimates place the number at 20,000. Note, Home Educa-
tion in America: Parental Rights Reasserted, 49 UMKC L. REv. 191, 193 & n.19 (1981). At least
400 home schools exist in North Carolina. Number of home schools grows to 400 in N. C., The News
and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), July 27, 1986, at IA, col. 5. "In all, about 1,000 to 1,500 Tar Heel
children may be getting their education at home, out of 58,000 private-school students statewide."
Id.; see also Forsyth Woman educates her own children at home, The News and Observer (Raleigh,
N.C.), Nov. 12, 1985, at 16C, col. 2 (at the time of the article approximately 250 North Carolina
families operated home schools). Approximately one million children attend Christian Day Schools.
Devins, A Constitutional Right to Home Instruction?, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 435, 435 n.4 (1984).
2. Lines, supra note 1, at 190. A few parents have attempted to teach their children at home
for reasons unrelated to dissatisfaction with public schools. See City of Akron v. Lane, 65 Ohio
App. 2d 90, 416 N.E.2d 642 (1979) (child with hearing problems); see also Abrahamson, We are Not
Immune, 10 DISTRICT L., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 6, col. 3 (incidents in which parents have removed
their children from public school to avoid danger of contracting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome); Note, Home Instruction: An Alternative to Institutional Education, 18 J. FAM. L. 353, 363
nn.49-51 (1979-80) (removal of children from public schools for various unusual reasons),
3. Devins, supra note 1, at 438; see Rice, Conscientious Objection to Public Education: The
Grievance and the Remedies, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 847; Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of
the Religion of Secular Humanism and its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEx. TECH L. Rrv. 1
(1978). For a comprehensive discussion of parental dissatisfaction with the public school system, see
Devins, State Regulation of Christian Schools, 10 J. LEGIS. 351 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Devins,
State Regulation]. See also Devins, Fundamentalist Schools vs. The Regulators, Wall St. J., Apr. 14,
1983, at 26, col. 3 (growth of Christian day schools).
4. See, ag., A BLUEPRINT FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (C. Marshner ed. 1984); L. BUz-
ZARD, SCHOOLS: THEY HAVEN'T GOT A PRAYER (1984); M. GABLER & N. GABLER, WHAT ARE
THEY TEACHING OUR CHILDREN? (1985); P. GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION AND THE
COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS (1964); J. HOLT, How CHILDREN FAIL (1967); J. HOLT, TEACH YOUR
OWN (1981); 1. ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (1970); E. REIMER, SCHOOL IS DEAD (1971); V.
SMITH, ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS (1974); S. SUGARMAN & J. COONS, EDUCATION BY CHOICE
(1978). For general criticism of public education, see J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER & S. KILGORE,
HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982)
(private schools generally do a betterjob of educating children than public schools); NATL. COMM'N
ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM
(1983) (report recommending restoration of core curriculum requirements and discipline in the pub-
lic schools).
For a discussion of the difference between mere "schooling" and "education," see Stocklin-
Enright, The Constitutionality of Home Education: The Role of The Parent, The State And The
Child, 18 WILLAMETTE L. J. 563, 564-65 n.9 (1982) (discussing L. KOTIN & W. AIKMAN, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 71 (1980)).
EDUCATION LAW
academic and social environments of public schools." s
The legality of home education was squarely presented to the North Caro-
lina courts for the first time in Delconte v. State.6 The North Carolina Supreme
Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that the North Carolina compulsory
education statutes7 permit parents to teach their children at home.8 The Del-
conte court did not decide whether home instruction is protected by either the
United States or North Carolina Constitutions. 9 This Note examines the Del-
conte holding in view of current state statutes, and after briefly reviewing the
federal constitutional law applicable to home education, suggests that the right
of parents to teach their children at home is guaranteed by the North Carolina
Constitution.
Larry Delconte and his wife Michelle moved from New York State to Har-
nett County, North Carolina with their four children in March 1981.10 They
had begun to teach their two school-age children at home in New York with the
permission of the local board of education.'1 After moving to North Carolina,
Delconte wrote to the State Coordinator of the Office of Nonpublic Education,
enclosing the information required and seeking approval of his school as a non-
public school in accordance with North Carolina General Statutes section 115C-
560.12 The state coordinator, relying on two opinions of the North Carolina
Attorney General finding that home education was not a satisfactory method of
compliance with the North Carolina compulsory education laws,13 refused to
5. Devins, supra note 1, at 438; see also S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF 75-134 (1983) (dis-
cussing parental dissatisfaction with the academic and social environment of public schools).
6. 313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1985).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-378, 115C-547 to -562 (1983). For a discussion of these statutes,
see infra text accompanying notes 105-24.
8. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 400, 329 S.E.2d at 646.
9. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 402, 329 S.E.2d at 647. In Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 98
(4th Cir. 1983), cera denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that neither the United States Constitution nor the North Carolina compulsory
education statutes give parents the right to teach their children at home. This decision precluded the
North Carolina Supreme Court from finding that the federal Constitution guarantees parents the
right to instruct their children at home in lieu of public school attendance. After the Duro decision,
one commentator predicted:
In light of the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Duro, it is unlikely that
the North Carolina Supreme Court would upset the Fourth Circuit's ruling on the religious
liberty issue in Duro. Consequently, if parents are to prevail in Delconte, it seems likely
that they will prevail on statutory grounds .... At the same time, such a decision would
not serve as a precedent in favor of a parent's constitutional right to teach his child at
home.
Devins, supra note 1, at 460. For criticism of the rationale of Duro see Note, Compulsory Educa-
tion: Weak Justifications in the Aftermath of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 62 N.C.L. RPv. 1167, 1171-72
(1984); see also infra notes 136-48 and accompanying text (brief discussion of Duro).
10. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 386, 329 S.E.2d at 638.
11. Id.
12. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-560 (1983) provides: "Any new school to which this part
relates shall send to a duly authorized representative of the State of North Carolina a notice of intent
to operate, name and address of the school, and name of the school's owner and chief
administrator."
13. 49 N.C. Att'y Gen. 8 (August 9, 1979) (home instruction not permitted under current
compulsory education statutes); see also 40 N.C. Att'y Gen. 211 (July 3, 1969) (home instruction did
not satisfy compulsory education requirements under Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1372, art. 20, § 1,
1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1600, 1600, repealed by Act of May 20, 1981, ch. 423, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess.
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acknowledge plaintiff's Hallelujah School as a "qualified nonpublic school." 14
Delconte continued to educate his children at home and was prosecuted for vio-
lation of the compulsory school attendance law.'- The state voluntarily dis-
missed these charges,16 and plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that "his
home instruction was not prohibited by [the compulsory education] statutes...
and, if it was, then these statutes contravened certain freedoms guaranteed to
him by the state and federal constitutions."
'1 7
The Delcontes set aside a room in their home with a blackboard and desk to
be used as a classroom.' 8 They used "books and materials obtained from
sources in New York and the Wake Christian Academy"' 19 for their instruction,
and the daily routine of the children included chores, playtime, and bible study
in addition to academic work.20 Delconte was a graduate of the United States
Merchant Marine Academy and had done substitute teaching in New York;
Mrs. Delconte had finished high school and one year of college and did not work
outside the home.21 The Delcontes instructed their children in basic reading,
writing, and mathematics during the entire year.22 Standardized test scores
showed that the children were "achieving at average or better than average rates
academically."
23
Delconte expressed both religious and "sociopsychological" objections to
Laws 510, 510 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-166 to-257 (1978)). For a discussion of
the significance of these opinions in the Delconte case, see infra note 153.
14. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387, 329 S.E.2d at 639. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -562
(1983) (concerning deregulated nonpublic schools, discussed infra text accompanying notes 105-24).
15. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387, 329 S.E.2d at 639. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983) requires
compulsory school attendance by children aged seven to sixteen.
16. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387, 329 S.E.2d at 639.
17. Id. at 386, 329 S.E.2d at 638. Plaintiff also alleged that he was a representative member of a
class of fundamentalist Christians "who have as their primary purpose the day to day education of
their children in accordance with Fundamentalist Christian principles, as required by the Holy Bi-
ble." Record at 3, Delconte.
18. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387, 329 S.E.2d at 639.
19. Id.
20. Id. At trial, plaintiff testified that "[o]ur children do get out into the community and visit
in the community. They do play with neighborhood kids and do go to local grocery stores." Record
at 42-43, Delconte.
21. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 386, 329 S.E.2d at 638. Plaintiff correctly asserted that he "would be
qualified to teach in a nonpublic school in North Carolina." Record at 4, Delconte. Mrs. Delconte
also would be qualified to teach in a nonpublic school in North Carolina, because N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-562 (1983) requires neither a teaching certificate nor a college degree for private school
instructors. According to his testimony at trial, Delconte had previously been the director of a home
for homeless men, had worked in orphanages, mental hospitals and psychiatric centers, and had
"worked with retarded children and worked as a group parent with retarded and emotionally dis-
turbed children." Record at 35, Delconte. Mrs. Delconte had had some experience working in a
nursery school. Id. Although Delconte asserted that "[tihe teaching of the children is done by both
Mr. and Mrs. Delconte under the supervision of Mr. Delconte," id. at 4, the North Carolina School
Boards Association's Brief implied that the Delcontes' home was an inferior educational facility
because Mr. Delconte worked outside the home and Mrs. Delconte's duties included taking care of
her two youngest children and "washing, ironing, cooking and cleaning, and taking care of the
animals." Amicus Curiae Brief [North Carolina School Boards Association] at 15, Delconte (quot-
ing Record at 40, Delconte).
22. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387, 329 S.E.2d at 639.
23. Id. Delconte's daughter's scores were "99th percentile in reading, 34th in math, 84th in
language and 84th in basic," id. at 387 n.4, 329 S.E.2d at 639 n.4; his son "tested in grade 2, mea-
sured at grade 4 in reading. His overall range was in the upper quartile." Id.
1304 (Vol. 64
public schooling.24 He objected to some aspects of the public school curriculum,
including the teaching of evolution, on religious grounds.25 His sociopsycho-
logical objections were based on his belief that children should not be sent away
to school "until 'they can [have] more of an effect on their environment than
their environment [can have] on them.' "26 At trial, Delconte testified that he
had not enrolled his children in a local Christian school because he could not
afford it, and because he believed that the family's home school was yielding fine
academic results and that home study was better than classroom education for a
child's overall personal development. 27 Delconte also noted his disagreement
with certain doctrinal teachings of the local Christian school and his opposition
to the administration of corporal punishment by teachers.
28
The trial court ruled in favor of Delconte, concluding that his home school
"was entitled to recognition as a qualified nonpublic schoor '29 under the com-
24. Id. at 387, 329 S.E.2d at 639.
25. Id. For the exposition of a basis from which a Christian might reasonably conclude that the
Bible mandates home instruction of children by their parents, see Amicus Curiae Brief [The Chris-
tian Legal Society] at 14-16, Delconte. At trial, Delconte also objected to the lack of religious re-
quirements for employment as a teacher in a public school and negatively assessed the moral values
of the teachers to whom his children were to be assigned. Record at 40, Delconte.
The supreme court quoted this passage of Delconte's testimony:
"It is accurate to say that my decision to teach my children in my home was a twofold
decision; that there were two reasons underlying that decision. One reason I would de-
scribe as a sociopsychological, common sense reason. The other reason is religious in na-
ture. It is a tough question for me to answer as to which of these reasons is more
important. Of course, I put Jesus Christ above anything. However, either reason alone
would be enough for me to want to teach my kids in the home. I can't answer the question
of whether I would send my children to public or private schools if my sociopsychological
objections for schooling outside the home changed. I have never had to consider that
question. It is a decision that would take a lot of deep thought. It would take an excep-
tional child of 12 years old, I think, to be able to stand in the Christian principles that
Christ has dictated to us with all these adult figures around him that are giving him a
different view. I think it would be better for my children to stay home, but if and when my
children are to the point that they can be more of an effect on their environment than their
environment on them, I would not want them to go, but if they wanted to go and they
wanted to use it as a field of witness for Christ, praise the Lord, let them go."
Delconte, 313 N.C. at 388, 329 S.E.2d at 639-40.
Some of Delconte's sociopsychological objections to institutional education, such as his belief
that "sending children from the home at an early age signifies to them rejection by their parents,"
id., are not patently religious. Delconte's putting "Jesus Christ above anything," however, arguably
indicates that his objections to public school education were predominantly based on religion. To
the extent that Delconte's sociopsychological objections dealt with the values imparted by public
schools, they probably were religious. For example, at trial Delconte testified:
The values that we teach are also the values that our children are taught at home so there is
no confusion in a child's mind when one thing is taught at home and one thing is taught at
school.... [I]t doesn't make sense to send a child to an institution to learn values that are
in direct opposition to the values that are being taught in the home.
Record at 37, Delconte.
26. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 388, 329 S.E.2d at 640.
27. Record at 42, Delconte.
28. Id. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975),
recognized the legitimacy of a state's parens patriae power in administering corporal punishment in
public schools, holding that "parental control over child-rearing" is not a fundamental constitutional
right. Id. at 299. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Supreme Court approved the use
of corporal punishment in public schools without addressing the question whether control over
childrearing constitutes a fundamental right of parents.
29. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 388, 329 S.E.2d at 640.
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pulsory attendance statutes.3° The trial court further held that if the North
Carolina compulsory education statutes did not permit home instruction, then
plaintiff's religious freedoms under the free exercise clause of the first amend-




The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision,3 4 concluding that
Delconte's home instruction did not constitute a qualified nonpublic school
within the meaning of the compulsory education statutes.3 5 The court also held
that the prohibition of home instruction as a means of satisfying the compulsory
education requirement did not violate Delconte's constitutionally protected reli-
gious freedom3 6 because the state's interest in supervising education allowed it
to make this policy decision.
37
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.38 The
court first noted that the North Carolina compulsory attendance law39 requires
children between the ages of seven and sixteen to attend public schools or
schools with teachers and curricula approved by the State Board of Education.40
The legislature, however, also provided that certain enumerated requirements
for "private church schools or schools of religious charter" 41 or for "qualified
nonpublic schools"42 were exclusive of all others.4 3 In determining whether the
general assembly intended to prohibit home instruction by allowing only institu-
tional settings to qualify as schools, the court reviewed the history of compul-
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-555 to -562 (1983). The trial court also held that Delconte's
home school qualified as a "school of religious charter" under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -554
(1983). Record at 53, Delconte. For a summary and discussion of these statutes, see infra text
accompanying notes 105-24 (statutory framework), and 154-60 (statutes relating to religious
schools).
The Delconte trial court held that the exclusivity provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-554,
-562 (1983), which preclude the application of standards other than those specifically enumerated to
private schools, were in direct conflict with the approval requirement in the basic compulsory educa-
tion law. Record at 53, Delconte. Because criminal penalties resulted from failure to meet the ap-
proval requirement, the trial court held that this provision had to yield to the exclusivity provision
for religious and qualified nonpublic schools. Id. This interpretation of the exclusivity provisions
obviously was correct only if Delconte's house instruction constitutes a "school" within the meaning
of the deregulation statutes.
31. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
32. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
33. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 388, 329 S.E.2d at 640.
34. Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 269, 308 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1983), rev'd, 313 N.C. 384,
329 S.E.2d 636 (1985).
35. Id.; see N.C. G N. STAT. §§ 115C-555 to -562 (1983). The court of appeals also ruled that
Delconte's home school did not qualify as a private church school or school of religious charter
under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -554 (1983). Delconte, 65 N.C. App. at 266, 308 S.E.2d at
902. See infra text accompanying notes 105-24 for a discussion of these statutes.
36. Delconte, 65 N.C. App. at 269, 308 S.E.2d at 904.
37. Id.
38. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 403, 329 S.E.2d at 648.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983).
40. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 389, 329 S.E.2d at 640.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -554 (1983).
42. Id. §§ 116C-555 to -562.
43. Id. § 115C-554 (enumerated requirements are the only provisions applicable to private




sory education legislation in North Carolina.44 Focusing particularly on the
1979 legislation that deregulated private schools,45 the court found that there
was no legislative intent to define the term "school," but only to prescribe cer-
tain minimum regulations to govern all nonpublic schools.46 The court noted:
[T]he evident purpose of these recent statutes is to loosen, rather than
tighten, the standards for nonpublic education in North Carolina. It
would be anomalous to hold that these recent statutes were designed to
prohibit home instruction when the legislature obviously intended
them to make it easier, not harder, for children to be educated in non-
public school settings.47
The court concluded that there were
four ways by which school-aged children in this state may comply with
our school attendance statutes. First, under N.C.G.S. Section 115C-
378, a child may attend public school. Second, under this same sec-
tion, a child may attend an "approved," "nonpublic school" which
maintains the required records and conducts its curriculum concur-
rently with the local public school. Third, a child may attend a "pri-
vate church school or school of religious charter" which meets the
requirements of Part 2, Article 39, Chapter 115C. Fourth, a child may
attend a "nonpublic school" which "qualifies" by meeting the require-
ments of Part 2, Article 39, Chapter 115C.
48
The supreme court held Delconte's home instruction qualified as a nonpub-
lie school because it received no funding from the State of North Carolina.49
44. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 397-400, 329 S.E.2d at 645-46.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -562 (1983).
46. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 400, 329 S.E.2d at 646.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 390, 329 S.E.2d at 640-41. The court's second method for satisfying the compulsory
education requirement is that a child attend an "approved" nonpublic school. This method appar-
ently reflects the requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983) that a private school have
"teachers and curricula that are approved by the State Board of Education." Perhaps under this
second method the approval requirements are replaced by the more minimal requirements for quali-
fied nonpublic schools in N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 115C-555 to -562. As a practical matter, however,
parents would seek certification of private school alternatives through the deregulatory legislation,
rather than seeking "approval" from the State Board of Education.
49. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 391, 329 S.E.2d at 641. The court of appeals relied upon the maxim
ejusdem generis in interpreting the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-555 (1983), quoted infra
text accompanying note 124. Under this canon of statutory construction, "where general words
follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily
be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations as including only
things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated." State v. Fenner, 263
N.C. 694, 697, 140 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1965). Because the first three criteria for qualification under the
statute involve accreditation by or membership in organizations of institutional schools, the court of
appeals held that the fourth criterion for qualification applied to institutional schools as well. Del-
conte, 65 N.C. App. at 266-67, 308 S.E.2d at 902-03. Thus, under the reasoning of the court of
appeals, the mere fact the Delcontes received no state funding did not qualify their program of
instruction as a nonpublic school. Id.
In response to the analysis of the court of appeals, the supreme court observed:
Subsection (4) is as specific a requirement as those contained in subsections (1), (2), and
(3). Each of the subsections is equally specific, discrete, and stands on its own footing. The
statute clearly requires that only one of the "characteristics" be present. Delconte's home
instruction meets the characteristic set out in subsection (4), Le., it receives no state
funding.
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The court stated, "We do not agree that the legislature intended simply by use of
the word 'school,' because of some intrinsic meaning invariably attached to the
word, to preclude home instruction." °50 In light of its determination that the
Delcontes could educate their children at home in compliance with the compul-
sory education statute, the court merely noted some of the constitutional issues
involved5 1 without resolving them.52 The court recognized, however, that if the
state prohibited home instruction altogether "serious constitutional questions
would arise,"' 53 because of the possible infringement of religious freedoms.
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether a state may
constitutionally prohibit home instruction altogether.54 The Court, however,
has made broad statements concerning society's interest in education55 and has
recognized that states have a parens patriae interest in the education of their
children.5 6 Consequently, states may reasonably regulate all forms of education
Delconte, 313 N.C. at 391, 329 S.E.2d at 641. For other interpretations of statutory construction
rules that could be argued against the supreme court's holding, see infra note 153.
50. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 392, 329 S.E.2d at 642. Because there were no North Carolina cases
interpreting the term "school," the court of appeals relied on cases from other jurisdictions for the
proposition that home instruction is not a form of school. Delconte, 65 N.C. App. at 266, 308 S.E.2d
at 907 (citing In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961); F & F v. Duval County,
273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967); State v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963); City of Akron v.
Lane, 65 Ohio App. 2d 90, 416 N.E.2d 642 (1979); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (,V. Va. 1981).
The supreme court distinguished all of these cases on the ground that they had interpreted
statutes with provisions concerning education that were more express than the North Carolina com-
pulsory education statutes. In this connection, the court quoted a Washington decision holding that
"'[t]he three essential elements of a school are (1) the teacher, (2) the pupil or pupils, and (3) the
place or institution.'" Delconte, 313 N.C. at 394, 329 S.E.2d at 643 (quoting State v. Superior
Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177, 182, 346 P.2d 999, 1002 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960)) (empha-
sis added).
The court also noted two state cases specifically permitting home instruction as a type of private
school. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 395-96, 329 S.E.2d at 643-44 (citing People v. Levisen, 404 111. 574, 50
N.E.2d 313 (1950); State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550 (1904)). From its review of the
relevant cases, the court concluded:
In summary, our sister jurisdictions, when faced with the question of whether home in-
struction is prohibited by school attendance statutes which specify various standards for
nonpublic schools, have almost always analyzed the question not in terms of any meaning
intrinsic to the word "school" but rather in terms of whether the particular home instruc-
tion in question met the statutory standards. In the absence of a clear legislative prohibi-
tion of home instruction, we think this is the better approach to the problem.
Delconte, 313 N.C. at 397, 329 S.E.2d at 644-45.
51. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 400-403, 329 S.E.2d at 646-48.
52. Id. at 402, 329 S.E.2d at 647.
53. Id. at 400, 329 S.E.2d at 646.
54. The constitutionality of compulsory education laws in general is beyond question. See, e.g.,
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240 (1977); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
55. Accord San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (recognizing "the importance of education to our democratic soci-
ety"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982) ("[Education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society," and when
children are not educated, "significant social costs [are] borne by our Nation.").
56. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society"); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
639 (1968) ("The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the state's constitutional
power to regulate.").
[Vol. 641308
for minors, including private education. 57 A state may not make public educa-
tion the only means of satisfying its compulsory education requirement, 58 but it
is not clear whether a state may require that private education be conducted in
an institutional setting. Specific state regulation of private education 59 may be
challenged as violating the free exercise clause of the first amendment 60 or the
due process of law clause of the fourteenth amendment.
61
Three Supreme Court cases in the 1920s involved challenges to state regula-
tion of education on due process grounds. The Court held for the parents in
each case, and each decision contains broad language that might be construed to
protect the right of parents to teach their children in the home. The first case,
Meyer v. Nebraska,62 overturned the conviction of a private tutor for teaching
German to elementary school students in violation of a state statute.63 The
Court opined that the goals of "Americanization" that the statute sought to
implement rested on "ideas touching the relationship between individual and
State [that are] wholly different from those upon which our [governmental] insti-
tutions rest." 64
In the second case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,65 the Court held that states
may not prohibit all forms of private education.66 The Court stated that "[t]he
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations."
67
In the third case, Farrington v. Tokushige,68 the Court dealt with a statute
governing schools conducted in foreign languages, 69 which were established by
57. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (asserting that a state may reason-
ably regulate private education in a case in which racial discrimination by private schools was held
unlawful); see also Note, The State and Sectarian Education: Regulations to Deregulation, 1980
DuKE L.J. 801, 811-12 n.59 (discussing other cases upholding states' power to regulate education to
achieve an informed citizenry).
58. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating Oregon statute requiring all
children to attend public schools but holding that private education may be reasonably regulated).
59. For state statutes allowing and regulating home education, see Note, supra note 2, at 364
nn.53-54. For discussions of the regulation of home study programs, see Lines, supra note 1, at 194-
97; Tobak & Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law, 8 U. DAYrON L.
REV. 1, 51-2 (1982); see also Devins, State Regulation, supra note 3 (discussing regulation of private
institutional schools).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...."). This guarantee of religious freedom was declared
binding upon the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Challenges to the unconstitutional vagueness of statutes requir-
ing children to attend "school" have not been very successful. See Lines, supra note 1, at 211 n.116.
In In re Gregory B., 88 Misc. 2d 313, 387 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Fam. Ct. 1976), a minor claimed that
he was not being educated in public schools, raising noneducation as a defense in a truancy proceed-
ing; the court concluded he would be better served in an inferior school than in no school at all. Id.
at 318, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
62. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
63. Id. at 400.
64. Id. at 402.
65. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
66. Id. at 535.
67. Id.
68. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
69. Id. at 291.
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Japanese parents in Hawaii.70 Finding that the legislation gave "affirmative di-
rection concerning the intimate and essential details of such schools ... and
[denied]... reasonable choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum
and textbooks,"'71 and that it would probably destroy most foreign language
schools, 72 the Court held that the legislation violated the fundamental rights of
the individual under the fifth amendment's due process clause.73 The Court also
noted that the legislation was "[a]pparently... a deliberate plan to bring foreign
language schools under a strict governmental control for . . . no adequate
reason."
74
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the right of pri-
vacy75 recognize some parental rights in child rearing. 76 One commentator,
however, believes that "[t]he right of parental control has only questionable sig-
nificance to future challenges to state regulations" 77 and suggests that most con-
temporary state regulations promote a legitimate state interest.78 Noting that
the regulation in Meyer was not related to a legitimate state interest 79 and that
statutes in Pierce and Farrington effectively foreclosed the private school op-
tion,80 this commentator observes that "the judiciary in the early twentieth cen-
tury was extremely protective of individual rights that seemed threatened by any
form of governmental action."
8 1
Challenges to state regulation of private education also may be based on the
free exercise clause of the first amendment. When an individual claims that his
or her constitutional right to free exercise of religion has been violated, a court is
required to determine (1) whether a sincere religious belief is infringed by en-
forcement of the statute, and (2) if so, whether the state's interest in the statute is
of "sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the
70. Id. at 290-91.
71. Id. at 298.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 298-99.
74. Id. at 298.
75. See Stocklin-Enright, supra note 4, at 566-68 (right of privacy is virtually identical to the
right to substantive due process).
76. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (The right to privacy "has some exten-
sion to activities relating to marriage,... child rearing and education."); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 211-212 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (listing "education and upbringing of children" as a
fundamental right in which one has freedom of choice). Justice Douglas, however, was the sole
dissenter in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the court concluded that Amish
parents had a right to remove their children from public schools after the eighth grade to protect
their free exercise of religion. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
77. Devins, supra note 1, at 455.
78. Devins, supra note 1, at 455.
79. Devins, supra note 1, at 455.
80. Devins, supra note 1, at 455. Devins also notes that although the Supreme Court has never
explicitly drawn the line separating reasonable from unreasonable regulation, language in Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968), could be read to allow states to preclude home instruc-
tion and require certification of teachers in private schools. He asserts that "[states have the power
to] insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory attendance laws,
[must] be at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified
training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction." Id. at 455-56.
81. Devins, supra note 1, at 455 (discussing LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 32 (S. Goldstein &
E. Gee ed. 1980)).
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Free Exercise clause." 82
In Wisconsin v. Yoder 83 the Supreme Court, although recognizing the legit-
imacy of a state's interest in mandating compulsory education, exempted Amish
children from compulsory high school attendance. 84 In granting the free exer-
cise claim of the Amish, the Court emphasized that the children to be exempted
were already near the age at which they could legally leave school.8 5 The Court
also noted that the parents had a heightened interest in governing their chil-
dren's education because of the impact that the school environment would have
on the children's decisions whether to remain in the Amish community.86 The
Court suggested that it would not have permitted the removal of the children if
they had seemed likely to leave the Amish community anyway87 or had been too
young to have acquired rudimentary academic skills.88 Further, the Court inti-
mated that the right to remove children from school does not extend to parents
motivated by nonreligious reasons. 89 Although Yoder recognized the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children,90 the decision "contains too
much language about the general authority of the state in education to be con-
82. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 185 (1965) (In a conscientious objector case, "the 'truth' of abelief is not open to question, [but]
there remains the significant question whether it is 'truly held' "; the test is whether beliefs are
sincerely held and whether they are, to the objector, "religious.").
83. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
84. Id. at 234.
85. Id. at 223-25.
86. Id. at 215-18. The majority paid scant attention to evidence that a significant number of
Amish children leave the old order. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
notion that parents are the caretakers of their children's rights, see Burt, Developing Constitutional
Rights of in and for Children, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 118, 123 (1975); Devins, supra note 1, at
451-52 nn.102-06, 108. For a summary of decisions limiting the requirement of parental consent for
medical treatment, abortion, and birth control, see id. at 452 n.106.
87. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-17.
88. Id. at 225.
89. The Court observed:
[T]he very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus,
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary similar values accepted by the majority ... their claims would not rest on a
religious basis ... [nor] rise to the demands of the religious clauses.
Id. at 215-16; see also authorities cited in Note, supra note 9, at 1169 n.24 (discussing Yoder's lim-
ited precedential value). For criticism that Yoder failed to address the children's rights issue ade-
quately, see Knudsen, The Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L. Rgv. 1506 (1974); Note,
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-The Balancing Process for Free Exercise Needs a New Scale,
51 N.C.L. REV. 302 (1972); Note, Adjudicating What Yoder Left Unresolved: Religious Rights for
Minor Children after Danforth and Carey, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 1135 (1978); see also Note, State
Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1383, 1388-89 (1974)
(suggesting that a "strict scrutiny" standard of constitutional review should be applied when parents
challenge state intrusion into family affairs based on a state's "collective" interests, but that a less
exacting standard should be used when the state intrudes primarily to aid the child personally). The
Yoder Court's emphasis on religious liberty issues to the detriment of due process claims is criticized
in Boothby, Government Entanglement with Religion: What Degree of Proof is Required?, 7 PEP-
PERDINE L. REv. 613 (1980) and in Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the
First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 215 (1973).
For a discussion of Yoder and subsequent judicial limitation of its doctrine, see Lines, supra
note 1, at 200-06. For a collection of commentary on Yoder, see Note, supra note 9, at 1169 n.24.
For a collection of Supreme Court cases on free exercise, see id. at 1167 n.2.
90. Devins, supra note 1, at 451-52.
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sidered a strong precedent in favor of nonreligious claims." 9 1 Under the ration-
ale of Yoder, the Court might accept an argument that compulsory education
outside the home unconstitutionally impedes the exercise of a true religious be-
lief.92 Even a claim based on religious belief, however, will not overcome the
parenspatriae interest of the state "if it appears that parental decisions will jeop-
ardize the health or safety of the child."
'93
Thirty-four states permit some form of home instruction to satisfy compul-
sory education requirements. 94 Two extremes in state regulation of home in-
struction can be seen in the statutes of Louisiana and Michigan.95 Louisiana
merely requires that parents furnish their proposed home study programs to the
State Board of Education and have their children take standardized tests at the
end of each school year.96 Michigan, on the other hand, requires that home
instructors be certified, thus effectively excluding most parents as teachers, 97 and
provides also that home instruction must be comparable to that provided in pub-
lic schools.
9 8
Many courts, like the Delconte court, have avoided deciding the constitu-
tionality of prohibiting home instruction by holding that a home is a school for
purposes of statutory compulsory educational requirements.9 9 In other cases,
91. Devins, supra note 1, at 453.
92. The Court noted:
[To agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police
power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause... and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regula-
tions of general applicability.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
93. Devins, supra note 1, at 233-34. For constitutional arguments in favor of home education,
see Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant [The Rutherford Institute] at 1-54, Delconte;
Stocklin-Enright, supra note 4; Note, The Right to Education: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 44 U. CiN.
L. REv. 786 (1975); Note, supra note 1.
For further discussions of the constitutional issues involved in compulsory education legislation,
see Devins, supra note 1, at 453 n.107 (discussing the significance of Supreme Court cases upholding
various constitutional claims by schoolchildren); Lines, supra note 1, at 209-12 (discussing constitu-
tional challenges to compulsory education laws); id. at 198 n.41 (citing cases challenging compulsory
education laws on constitutional grounds); id. at 195-95 n.21 (citing state cases allowing the state to
regulate private educational alternatives); id. at 214-17 (discussing cases on the permissible scope of
state regulation of private schools); Stocklin-Enright, supra note 4, at 589-602 (discussing the consti-
tutionality of five state statutes in particular); Note, supra note 2, at 369-70 (discussing state cases in
which it was argued that home education was a constitutional right); Note, supra note I, at 198-202
(discussing Supreme Court cases on education).
94. Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 59, at 12. For compendiums of state compulsory attendance
laws, see Lines, supra note 1, at 220-34, 195 nn.24-26, 196 nn.29-33, 197 nn.34-37; Note, supra note
2, at 379-81. For a discussion of state statutes allowing home education and regulating it to various
degrees, see Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 59. For other discussions of compulsory attendance statutes
see Stocklin-Enright, supra note 4, at 603-10 (discussing various features of state regulation with
extensive citations to statutes); Note, supra note 1, at 194-98.
95. Devins, supra note 1, at 442.
96. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 17:236 (West 1982).
97. Devins, supra note 1, at 443.
98. Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 5579, Sept. 27, 1979 (interpreting MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 380.1561 (1979)). For an analysis of various state statutes that permit "equivalent" or "compara-
ble" instruction in lieu of public school attendance, see Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 59, at 6-10; see
also infra note 163 (concerning evidence on the merit of home instruction and the burden of proof
under equivalency statutes).
99. See, eg., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974); People v.
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private schools, including teacher certification, over the religious liberty objec-
tions of school officials.10 7 In response the general assembly passed legisla-
tion108 that effectively deregulated private schools.10 9 In the opinion of the
Attorney General of North Carolina, however, this new legislation did not allow
parents to educate their children at home as a means of satisfying the compul-
sory education requirement. 110
The deregulatory legislation1 11 begins with a statement of its policy:
In conformity with the constitutions of the United States and of North
Carolina, it is the public policy of the State in matters of education that
"No human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere
with the rights of conscience," or with religious liberty and that "reli-
gion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind ... the means of education shall forever
be encouraged."
'1 12
This first part of the legislation deals with "private church schools and schools
of religious charter." Such schools are required to maintain immunization
records, operate for nine calendar months of the year, excluding vacations and
holidays, and be subject to "reasonable fire,. health and safety inspections.., as
required by law." 113 They must administer standardized achievement tests peri-
odically and maintain test records for annual inspection.1 14 In addition, schools
to which the statute applies must administer a high school competency test to
eleventh graders after establishing some minimum passing score on the exam as
a graduation requirement. 115 Private church schools or schools of religious
charter may voluntarily participate in programs operated or sponsored by the
state, including the administration of testing. 116 The statute also requires that
schools subject to the regulation give notice of operation and termination of op-
eration1 17 and creates a position for an officer to receive such reports. 118 The
legislation explicitly exempts religious schools from the application of any other
107. State v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 CVS 1678 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake County,
Sept. 1, 1978), vacated as moot and dismissed, N.C. May 4, 1979 (see Plaintiff Appellee's Brief (Ex-
hibit A), Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 898 (1985)). For an interesting account of
their legal battles by some of the defendants in this class action suit against 11 North Carolina
Christian schools and a statement of their grievances, see K. KELLY, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
VS. CHRISTIAN LIBERTY (n.d.) (available in the library of the School of Law, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-547 to -562 (1983).
109. See Note, supra note 57, at 802-03. For an overview of the history of North Carolina
compulsory education legislation, see Delconte, 313 N.C. at 397-400, 329 S.E.2d at 645-46.
110. 49 N.C. Att'y Gen. 8 (August 9, 1979). An earlier opinion, 40 N.C. Att'y Gen. 211 (July 3,
1969), averred that home instruction did not satisfy the requirement under former previous North
Carolina compulsory education laws.
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-547 to -554 (1983).
112. Id. § 115C-547 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13, article IX, § 1).
113. Id. § 115C-548.
114. Id. § 115C-549.
115. Id. § 115C-550.
116. Id. § 115C-551.
117. Id. § I15C-552.
118. Id. § 115C-553.
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the parties failed to present the constitutional issue to the courts, especially
when "secondary issues involving the permissibility of expansive state regula-
tion" 1° ° were involved. Several courts have intimated that no constitutional
right to home instruction exists. 10 1 Others have recognized that the right to
home education may be protected by either the free exercise clause 0 2 or the due
process clause.10 3 States that permit home study unequivocally claim the au-
thority to regulate it.1°4
The North Carolina compulsory education law requires children between
the ages of seven and sixteen "to attend school continuously for a period equal to
the time which the public school to which the child is assigned shall be in ses-
sion.105 "School" is defined to include all public schools and such nonpublic
schools that have teachers and curricula that are approved by the State Board of
Education.
10 6
In 1979 a North Carolina trial court upheld comprehensive regulation of
Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550
(1904).
Other courts have not accepted home instruction as equivalent to school instruction. See State
v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701, 703, 383 P.2d 962, 964 (1963); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 39, 146 A. 170,
170-71 (1929); State ex reL Shoreline School Dist. No. 412 v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346
P.2d 999 (1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960); State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 363, 124 P. 910,
911 (1912); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359, 364 (W. Va. 1981). These cases are discussed in Devins,
supra note 1, at 460-62 & 460 n.157, 461 n.158.
100. Devins, supra note 1, at 461; see id. at 459-61 nn.150-64 for some of these rulings.
101. See Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Scoma v. Chicago Bd.
of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1974); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 40, 146 A. 170, 171
(1929); State ex rel. Shoreline School Dist. No. 412 v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999,
1003 (1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960).
102. See, eg., State v. LaBarge, 134 Vt. 276, 280, 357 A.2d 121, 124 (1976) (suggesting in dicta
that first amendment concerns sometimes override the state's interest in compulsory education); see
also State v. Nobel, No. 5791-0114-A, S-791-0115-A, slip op. at 8 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Allegan County
Jan. 9, 1980) (finding no evidence of a compelling state interest in teacher certification laws that
would override the religious liberty interests of parents). But cf. Devins, supra note 1, at 466-67
(discussion of home education cases rejecting free exercise claims).
The text of the opinion in State v. Nobel, No. 5791-0114-A, S-791-0115-A (Mich. Dist. Ct.
Allegan County Jan. 9, 1980), is reprinted in Appendix of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant
[The Rutherford Institute] at 104, Delconte. This appendix also contains other recent unpublished
trial court decisions concerning home education. Id. at 116-83. The text of the brief contains a
comprehensive pro-home education analysis of many state home instruction cases. Brief of Amid
Curiae in Support of Appellant at 59-70, Delconte.
103. See, eg., Peirce v. New Hampshire State Bd. of Educ., 122 N.H. 765, 768, 481 A.2d 363,
367-68 (1982) (Douglas and Brock, J.J., concurring); People v. Turner, 277 A.D.2d 317, 317-20, 98
N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); see also Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641, slip op. at 9
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 1978) ("Nonreligious as well as religious parents have the right to choose
from the full range of educational alternatives for their children."). For discussions of Perchemlides,
see S. ARONS, supra note 5, at 75-134 (1983); Stocklin-Enright, supra note 4, at 598-599. The unpub-
lished trial court decision in Perchemlides is reproduced in Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant [The Rutherford Institute] at 116, Delconte.
104. "Where the statute has an explicit exception and specific requirements for home study,
courts have adamantly rejected the arguments of parents that home study qualifies as a private
school. Similarly, courts have insisted upon compliance with the procedural prerequisites specified
in the statute." Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 59, at 58.
For cases allowing home instruction, see Stocklin-Enright, supra note 4, at 609-10 n.152. For
cases holding that a home does not qualify as a private school, see Note, supra note 2, at 365 nn.56-
60.
105. N.C. GaN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1983).
106. Id.
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requirements except those pertaining to basic safety.1 19
The second part of the statute relates to "qualified nonpublic schools."
120
It imposes the same requirements for qualified nonpublic schools as for private
church schools or schools of religious charter 12 1 and provides that these require-
ments are exclusive. 122 Although this part of the deregulatory legislation con-
tains no policy statement analogous to that prefacing the part relating to
religious schools,12 3 the statute defines a qualified nonpublic school as having
one or more of the following characteristics:
(1) It is accredited by the State Board of Education.
(2) It is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools.
(3) It is an active member of the North Carolina Association of In-
dependent Schools.
(4) It receives no funding from the State of North Carolina.
124
Prior to Delconte the North Carolina courts had never decided a case spe-
cifically concerning the permissibility of home education. In In re McMillan 12 5
the court of appeals upheld a finding that children were neglected because they
did not attend school, but the court specifically noted that there was "no show-
ing that [the children received] any mode of educational program alternative to
those in the public school."' 126 In State v. Vietto, 127 decided under the old com-
pulsory education statute,128 a mother removed her child from private school
and placed her in a tutorial institution. 129 The North Carolina Supreme Court
overturned the mother's conviction for violating the compulsory attendance
law,130 noting that there was a lack of competent evidence that the tutorial insti-
119. Id. § 115C-554.
120. Id. §§ 11SC-555 to -562.
121. Id. §§ 115C-556 to -561.
122. Id. § 115C-562.
123. See supra text accompanying note 112 for the language of the policy statement concerning
religious schools.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-555. For a criticism of this deregulatory approach to education,
see Note, supra note 57, at 834-36 (arguing that state supervision through testing alone is
inadequate).
125. 30 N.C. App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693 (1976). In McMillan a parent refused to send his chil-
dren to a public school that did not teach American Indian heritage and culture. Another case
involving protest of education policy is State v. Chavis, 45 N.C. App. 438, 263 S.E.2d 356 (1980). In
Chavis Indian parents refused to send their children to the public school to which they were assigned
under Department of Health, Education and Welfare guidelines. The court of appeals upheld the
parents' conviction for failing to send their children to the assigned school. Id. at 443, 263 S.E.2d at
360. For a brief discussion of Chavis, see Lines, supra note 1, at 207-08. In State v. Williams, 253
N.C. 377, 117 S.E.2d 444 (1960), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the state may regu-
late business, trade, and correspondence schools provided such regulation is reasonable and not
arbitrary.
126. McMillan, 30 N.C. App. at 238, 226 S.E.2d at 695.
127. 297 N.C. 8, 252 S.E.2d 732 (1979).
128. Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1372, art. 20, § 1, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1600, 1600, repealed by
Act of May 20, 1981, Ch. 423, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 510, 510 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115-166 (1978)).
129. Vietto, 297 N.C. at 9-11, 252 S.E.2d at 733.
130. Id. at 13, 252 S.E.2d at 735.
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tution was not approved by the State Board of Education. 131 Because neither In
re McMillan nor State v. Vietto involved home education, these cases shed little
light on the constitutionality of prohibiting home instruction.
Three provisions of the North Carolina Constitution are central to the
home education debate. Article I, section 15 provides that "[tihe people have a
right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and
maintain that right."'132 Article IX, section 1 provides that "[r]eligion, morality,
and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of man-
kind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be en-
couraged."' 33 Article IX, section 3 requires that "[t]he General Assembly shall
provide that every child of appropriate age and of sufficient mental ability shall
attend the public schools, unless educated by other means."134 In considering
the religious claims of the Delcontes to educate their children at home, North
Carolina's "conscience clause" must also be analyzed. This clause provides that
"[a]ll persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority
shall, in any case whatever, contend or interfere with the rights of
conscience."
135
In Duro v. District Attorney 136 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided a case involving facts very similar to those in Delconte.
Plaintiff in Duro, who taught his five school-age children at home because of his
religious opposition to the "unisex movement ... and the promotion of secular
humanism,"' 137 argued that the North Carolina compulsory education law was
unconstitutional as applied to him because it violated his religious freedom
under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
138
The district court, relying partially on Wisconsin v. Yoder,139 held that because
North Carolina had "so drastically undercut its asserted interest in the univer-
sality of education" by deregulating private schools, there was no compelling
state interest in preventing a parent from educating his or her child at home. 140
The court of appeals,' 4 however, reversed this ruling. That court distinguished
Yoder' 42 and held that North Carolina's interest in compulsory education, de-
131. Id. at 12-13, 252 S.E.2d at 735. A concurring opinion emphasized the lack of evidence of
willful violations of the statute. Id. at 13, 252 S.E.2d at 735 (Huskins, J., concurring).
132. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
133. Id. art. IX, § 1.
134. Id. art. IX, § 3.
135. Id. art. I, § 13.
136. 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
137. Id. at 97.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of Yoder.
140. Duro v. District Attorney, No. 81-13-Civ. 2, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982), rey'd,
712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
141. Duro, 712 F.2d at 99.
142. The court of appeals distinguished Yoder from Duro on two grounds. First, the Duros were
not members of a long established religious community, as were the Amish parents in Yoder. Sec-
ond, the Amish parents allowed their children to attend public school through the eighth grade, but
the Duros refused to enroll their children in any institutional school. Duro, 712 F.2d at 98.
1316 [Vol. 64
EDUCATION LAW
spite its substantial deregulation of private education, prevailed over Duro's in-
terest in religious liberty.
143
In ruling for the Delcontes the North Carolina trial court relied on the
decision of the federal district court in Duro.14 By the time Delconte reached
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit had reversed the federal district court's decision in Duro.1
45
Noting the decision of the court of appeals in Duro,14 6 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals held that even if Delconte had a protected religious belief that was
infringed by the compulsory education statutes, the state retained an overriding
interest in education and could preclude the home instruction option.1 47 In
view of the decision in Duro, it would have been highly irregular for the North
Carolina Supreme Court to have ruled in Delconte that the United States Consti-
tution guarantees parents the right to educate their children at home. 148
The Delconte court's statutory interpretation was a reasonable reading of
the "qualified nonpublic school" deregulation statute.14 9 The court asserted
that the general assembly probably did not intend to preclude the home instruc-
tion option. 50 It would be more accurate to say that the general assembly prob-
ably did not contemplate home instruction in enacting the legislation. The
statute was a swift legislative reaction to the strictures placed on religious
schools by State v. Columbus Christian Academy.l5 ' In enacting the legislation,
the general assembly probably intended to preserve the existence of nonpublic
schools like the Columbus Christian Academy. 152 The supreme court in Del-
conte, however, interpreted the legislation as intended to loosen requirements on
nonpublic education, concluding that it would be "anomalous" to hold that the
statute was designed to prohibit home instruction.
153
143. Id. at 99.
144. Record at 54, Delconte.
145. See Duro, 712 F.2d at 96.
146. Delconte, 65 N.C. App. at 264 n.1, 308 S.E.2d at 901 n.1.
147. Id. at 269, 308 S.E.2d at 904.
148. See supra note 9. Before the North Carolina Supreme Court, Delconte distinguished the
Duro case from his own. Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 6, Delconte ("[P]laintiff in the Duro case
was seeking to have the North Carolina Compulsory School Attendance laws declared unconstitu-
tional. The plaintiff-appellant herein [argues that he] complied with the ... Attendance laws.").
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-555 to -562 (1983).
150. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 402, 329 S.E.2d at 648.
151. No. 78 CVS 1678 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake County, Sept. 1, 1978), vacated as moot and
dismissed, N.C. May 4, 1979. See Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief (Exhibit A), Delconte, 65 N.C. App. 262,
308 S.E.2d 898 (1985). See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of this
case.
152. Telephone interview with Edd Nye, North Carolina State Representative for Bladen
County (March 7, 1986) (In deliberations on the deregulatory statutes, home education was "not
even discussed."); Devins, supra note 1, at 457-58 n.141; Note, supra note 57, at 802-03; see also K.
KELLY, supra note 107 (discussing viewpoint of the defendant Christian School educators in Colum-
bus Christian Academy); supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (brief discussion of Columbus
Christian Academy).
Because home schools existed in North Carolina in the 1960s and 1970s, long after the compul-
sory education laws were originally adopted, it could be argued that the legislature acquiesced in
their existence. See Plaintiff-Appellant's New Brief at 13, Delconte. There was no case law at that
time approving home education.
153. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 400, 329 S.E.2d at 646. Holding that a home education program
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The supreme court in Delconte did not adopt the trial court's conclusion
that Delconte's home qualified as a private church school or school of religious
charter. 154 It can be argued, however, that Delconte's home instruction met the
definition of "school" implied in the policy statement1 55 concerning schools of
could not meet the statute's standards for qualification as a nonpublic school might also be anoma-
lous. It could be argued, however, that a family home cannot qualify as a nonpublic school because
the legislature intended that the only schools to be deregulated by virtue of receiving no state fund-
ing should be educational institutions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-555 (1983).
There are at least three rules of statutory construction in addition to that of ejusdem generis,
supra note 49, that can be advanced against the argument that home instruction constitutes a non-
public school. The first is that courts should "look first to the ordinary meaning of the word[sJ"
used in a statute. State v. Ludlum, 303 N.C. 666, 671, 281 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1981). Because the
standard definition of a school is a place of instruction, it might be argued that home instruction
cannot constitute a school. See Amicus Curiae Brief [North Carolina School Boards Assn.] at 5,
Delconte. The Delcontes, however, did have a place in their home, complete with a blackboard,
desk, and books, where instruction was imparted. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387, 329 S.E.2d at 639.
The second rule of statutory construction is that "ordinarily it is reasonable to presume the
words used in one place in the statute have the same meaning in every other place in the statute."
Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 298 N.C. 476, 483, 259 S.E.2d 558, 563 (1979). Schools are
ordinarily thought of as buildings in which students gather to learn. Therefore, it could be argued
that home instruction does not comprehend this ordinary meaning of the word school. Amicus
Curiae Brief [North Carolina School Boards Assn.] at 5, Delconte. The ordinary meaning of a word,
however, can include different forms within the same definition. For example, "a school of thought"
is not a form of the ordinary definition of school. "Correspondence School," however, would be
included in what one means when he or she speaks of a school, although it does not involve a
building or students gathering to learn. Thus, "home schools," like "correspondence schools," are
arguably encompassed by the statutory definition.
A third rule that might be used to find that homes do not qualify as schools is that when
statutory language is ambiguous, the interpretation of those who execute the law should be consid-
ered "strongly persuasive," eg., Shealy v. Association Transp., 252 N.C. 738, 742, 114 S.E.2d 702,
705 (1960), or even "primafacie correct." In re Vanderbilt Univ., 252 N.C. 743, 747, 114 S.E.2d
655, 658 (1960). Under this rule of construction, it could be argued that the court in Delconte should
have accorded great weight to the Attorney General's opinion, 49 N.C. Att'y Gen. 8 (August 9,
1979), which held home instruction permissible. See Amicus Curiae Brief [North Carolina School
Boards Assn.] at 5, Delconte. The court of appeals noted that the general assembly had failed to
respond to the Attorney General's opinions concerning home instruction. Delconte, 65 N.C. App.
267, 308 S.E.2d at 903. The supreme court conceded that the Attorney General's opinions were
persuasive but concluded that they were not binding. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 387 n.3, 329 S.E.2d at
639 n.3.
It could also be argued that the deregulation statute applies only to institutions, because fire,
health, and safety standards do not generally apply to private homes, See Amicus Curiae Brief
[North Carolina School Boards Assn.] at 3-4, Delconte. Another argument against deregulation
including home instruction is that establishment of a passing grade on a competency examination by
a "chief administrative officer" implies that only institutions are contemplated. Generally, only in-
stitutions have chief administrative officers and issue diplomas.
N.C. GEM. STAT. § 155C-562 (1983), however, makes qualified nonpublic schools subject to
"requirements of law" respecting fire, health, and safety. That few of these requirements apply to
private homes, however, does not necessarily mean that a private home cannot be a school. It would
appear reasonable to read the statute as specifying the requirements, if any, from which a school is
not exempted. It would also seem reasonable to regard the minimum competency test score in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-558 as a substitute for a formal diploma, although the competency test require-
ment is enumerated in an institutional context. These readings of the exclusivity and competency
testing provisions are better interpretations, because the qualifying statute, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-555, does not explicitly require that a school be an institution. Furthermore, as the trial
court noted, violations of the compulsory attendance requirements are subject to criminal penalties,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 155C-380, and statutes entailing criminal penalties should be strictly construed.
Revis Sand and Stone, Inc. v. King, 49 N.C. App. 168, 170, 270 S.E.2d 580, 581 (1980); Record at
53, Delconte.
154. Record at 53, Delconte.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-547 (1983).
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religious charter. 156 The exclusivity provision of this statute15 7 applies to any
"school, operated by any church or other organized religious body as part of its
religious ministry."' 58 This definition might be interpreted to exclude home in-
struction in the Delconte case because Delconte's ministry was not that of an
organized religious group. 159 This language also might imply that only institu-
tional schools are permitted because organized religious bodies would be ex-
pected to maintain institutional schools. The policy of the statute, however, is to
protect the rights of conscience. 160 The court might have held that even if the
statute did not permit home instruction, the North Carolina Constitution guar-
anteed this right to the Delcontes on religious grounds. However, this holding
would not have permitted parents to instruct their children at home on nonreli-
gious grounds.
With respect to the quality of nonpublic education, there is little evidence
that home schools or religious private schools do an inferior job of instructing
children academically. 161 In fact, many parents who instruct their children at
home may do a better job than the public schools. 162 Although the state has a
156. The Coordinator of Nonpublic Education testified: "The least number of students that an
approved private school has, I believe, is 3. I do not believe that we have at this time a school that
has only two pupils." Record at 34, Delconte. The Coordinator's use of the word "approve" was a
mistake, because he had earlier stated that after passage of the deregulation legislation his office no
longer "approved" schools but merely "recognize[d] that a school is in compliance with the law."
Id. at 32. The Delcontes' lawyer noted that the State Board of Education had defined a school as
having a teacher and curricula, both of which the Delcontes' home instruction program had. Plain-
tiff-Appellants New Brief at 8, Delconte.
Based on this testimony the trial court found that "if in addition to the two Delconte children
being taught, one additional nonrelated child were taught in the school, then the Hallelujah School
would have been acknowledged by the Office of Nonpublic Education." Record at 47, Delconte. To
permit the number of unrelated children in attendance to be the deciding factor in defining home
instruction programs as schools would be arbitrary because it would prohibit parents with eight
children from instructing their children at home, but would allow parents with two children to
instruct their children and one other at home; the addition of one unrelated child would make a
school an institution.
In Delconte the state argued that North Carolina relies on collective parental pressure to ensure
that children are well-educated in deregulated private schools. New Brief for the State at 18, Del-
conte. It could also be argued that the state relies on the concern of parents for their own children to
ensure an adequate education. Parental concern could ensure quality home instruction despite the
fact a child's education would be "dependent solely upon the ability and motivation of a single set of
parents." New Brief for the State at 18, Delconte.
Before the court of appeals the State argued that the deregulation statute should apply only to
"established educational institutions." Brief for the State at 13, Delconte, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308
S.E.2d 898. The Delcontes responded that this limitation would preclude the opening of new non-
public schools. Plaintifl-Appellee's Brief at 8, Delconte, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 898. Before
the North Carolina Supreme Court, the State argued instead that the statutory definition of school
included only organized education institutions. New Brief for the State at 21, Delconte.
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-554 (1983).
158. Id.
159. See Amicus Curiae Brief [North Carolina School Boards Assn.] at 3, Delconte.
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-547 (1983).
161. See Lines, supra note 1, at 192-93; see also Forsyth Woman educates her own children at
home, The News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 12, 1985, at 16C, col. 3 ("Neither state nor
federal officials [can] provide statistics on how home-school children perform as a group.").
162. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 544-56 (1979) (testimony of Dr. Paul
Kienel, Executive Director of the Association of Christian Schools International); Heard, Church-
Related Schools: Resistance to State Control Increases, ErDuc. WEEK, Feb. 17, 1982, at 1, 10, 18; see
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strong interest in ensuring that children are adequately educated, this interest
can be satisfied through the use of achievement tests.163 Such tests are a mini-
mally intrusive means of ensuring that children receive adequate academic in-
struction.164 Although a state might argue that this post hoc regulation is not a
sufficient safeguard, achievement tests are the only objective way of evaluating
the adequacy of public education.165 If a student scores adequately on achieve-
ment tests, there is really no need to regulate home instruction by requiring that
teachers be certified, a requirement that would effectively foreclose the home
education alternative for most parents.'
66
Institutional schooling, however, whether public or private, imparts more
to children than mere academic instruction. Institutional education places chil-
dren in a group of their peers under the supervision of an adult other than their
also materials reproduced in Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant [The Rutherford Insti-
tute] at 219-38, Delconte (praising home instruction as a superior alternative).
163. Parents who educate their children at home generally do not challenge the right of the state
to ensure the minimum academic competence of their children. See Ball, Religious Liberty: New
Issues and Past Decisions, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM 327-49 (P. McCulligan & R.
Rader ed. 1981). Similarly, "Christian schools have generally been willing to submit their 'product'
voluntarily to reasonable evaluation by the state through achievement testing." Note, State Regula-
tion of Private Religious Schools in North Carolina-A Model Approach, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
405, 416 (1980). Courts and commentators are divided on the propriety of using achievement tests
to satisfy a state's interest in ensuring adequate education. See, e.g., Kentucky State Bd. of Educ. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979) (encouraging the use of achievement tests to ensure that
children are adequately educated); State v. Faith Baptist Church, 197 Neb. 802, 816-17, 301 N.W.2d
571, 579-80 (1981) (criticizing this use of achievement tests); See Devins, supra note 1, at 473-74 &
n.228 (approving achievement testing to ensure adequate education); Note, supra note 2, at 374-77
(calling for much more intrusive state supervision of home education).
For a discussion of a prosecutor's objection to the introduction of standardized test scores of
Christian school students in State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), see Rice,
supra note 3, at 886. For another discussion of Whisner, see Stocklin-Enright, supra note 4, at 592-
94. See also Lines, supra note 1, at 212-14 (discussing cases that deal with whether the state or the
parents bear the burden of proof under statutes requiring "equivalent" instruction in lieu of public
school attendance); Note, supra note 2, at 366-69 (discussing cases dealing with home instruction as
an "equivalent" alternative); supra text accompanying note 90 (example of strict regulation of home
instruction).
164. Home instruction need not foreclose future educational and career opportunities. A high
school competency test can substitute as a high school diploma in a job search. The University of
California at Berkeley admits home instructed students if they pass proficiency examinations. See
Note, supra note 2, at 372; see also Williams, Little Redwood Schoolhouse, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5,
1983, at 206 (Harvard University accepted student after 12 years of home instruction.).
165. See Devins, supra note 1, at 473. Poor performance, however, may not be grounds for
immediate removal of a child from a home instruction situation:
If it turns out that a child does not test as well as might have been hoped, however, it
makes sense to remember that we do not remove our children from public school when
they fail tests. The testing process should be viewed, at least initially in any case, as an
opportunity to remedy any shortcomings that may be uncovered, unless the shortcomings
are so significant as to reflect serious defects in the methodology of the home education
program and substantial failure on the part of the child to make reasonable educational
progress.
Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641, slip op. at 12, n.7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 1978)
166. See Devins, supra note 1, at 472 (discussion of the permissibility of different types of state
regulation of home education). Compare People v. Turner, 277 A.D. 317, 319-20, 98 N.Y.S.2d 886,
888 (1950) (equivalency requirement did not mandate instruction by certified teachers) with State v.
M.M., 407 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (parents conducting home instruction required
to meet state laws and regulations pertaining to private tutors).
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parents. 167 Some courts have held that the socialization of children in groups
serves an important state interest in preparing children to be self-sufficient and
to participate in society. 168 Other courts have suggested that sending children
to school provides the state with an opportunity for professionals to discover
problems created by inadequate child rearing.169 This latter rationale is dubious
at best, given that parents, not the state, have the initial and primary responsibil-
ity for their children's physical, mental, and social well-being. 170 The state
should intervene only when parents fail in this responsibility. Except in clear-
cut cases such as the physical abuse of children, no standard of "inadequate
child rearing" can be applied to parents that does not lack consistency in admin-
istration and societal consensus. The argument that these debatable "problems"
of adequate child rearing can be resolved by public school officials is really an
argument that public schools should enforce the educational establishment's
idea of the proper way to raise children. The concern that children will be phys-
ically abused by home educating parents is also unwarranted. Parents who take
the time and trouble to devise a home instruction program for their children
under state guidelines will not be the type of parents who physically abuse their
children, except in the view of those who regard any physical chastisement of
children as "abuse." This perceived danger is hardly an argument for erecting a
purely institutional educational system. The argument that children should be
167. One commentator has encapsulated the following ideological defense of government
schooling:
1. The problem of conflict between families and schools is one of balancing the interests
of the two. Parents do have important rights and responsibilities, but society has the pre-
dominant responsibility for family morals and belief....
2. One of the obligations of the public that can legitimately be carried out through school
policy is the protection of children from "bad" parenting....
3. Home schooling does not respect the rights of children to differ from parents and
impose [sic] an even more rigid orthodoxy upon a dissenting child than any school system
ever could.
4. School is an essential force of social cohesion....
5. The socialization of children in groups is essential. Only through peer-group schooling
can children learn to get along in a highly interdependent society.
6. The mixing of children from different backgrounds and from families with differing
beliefs and values is vital to peace in a pluralistic society....
7. The adequate function of the American democratic system requires that every child be
taught the values of liberty as well as the skills of literacy....
8. Children who are educated at home ... may become a social burden in a complex
society and may be deprived of economic opportunity.
S. ARONS, supra note 5, at 121-23.
168. See, eg., State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 39, 146 A. 170, 170-71 (1929) (not unreasonable for
state to require a socialization component). Hoyt was severely restricted by In re Pierce, 122 N.H.
762, 451 A.2d 363 (1982) (under statute allowing home education, due process requires that parents
be informed of any deficiencies in their proposed program before permission to educate at home is
denied). See also In re Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436,439, 672 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1983) (noting with approval
testimony that "a school with more children would be generally better for any child since it would
provide more social interaction outside of the home," whether or not parents would be competent to
teach); Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 92, 189 A. 131, 137 (Essex County Ct. 1937) (schools
are to instill character and good citizenship as well as impart education; given the complexities of
modern life, home instruction cannot provide the requisite "experiences in group activity"). But see
State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 386, 231 A.2d 252, 255 (1967) (describing the socialization
rationale as "untenable").
169. See, eg., State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359, 364 (W. Va. 1981).
170. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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socialized in institutional educational settings deserves more discussion, but it is
equally flawed. 171
Historically, parents have retained the right to shape their children's social-
ization.1 72 Today, through compulsory education laws, the state limits the exer-
cise of parental discretion to a greater extent than in earlier times.1 73 The
"correct" socialization of children, however, is not readily defined in a pluralis-
tic society. The law generally presumes that a parent will care for his or her
child and that a parent is more sensitive to the child's needs than the state can
be. 174 Except in areas such as child labor in which parental discretion exercised
against societal consensus would obviously be detrimental to the child, 175 the
law favors permitting parents to make child rearing decisions.
1 76
The issue of who should decide how a child is to be socialized is inextrica-
171. For a brief discussion of opposing schools of educational theory, see Devins, supra note 1, at
468-70 (discussing these theories in the context of the scope of legitimate state authority).
172. See, eg. State Bd. of Educ. v. Purse, 101 Ga. 422, 28 S.E. 896 (1897) (Schools exist for the
benefit of the parent, not the state or the child.); Rulison v. Post, 79 111, 567, 573 (1875) (Education
and nurture of the child is left to the discretion of parents.); T. FINEGAN, FREE SCHOOLS: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE FREE SCHOOL MOVEMENT IN NEw YORK STATE 53 (1921) (important
issue in the debate over establishing public schools was whether parents could demand such state aid
to education, not whether states could compel child's attendance); E. KNIGHT, EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 100 (3d ed. 1951) (dealing with pre-revolutionary Massachusetts); J. MILLER, THE
FIRST FRONTIER: LIFE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 224-25 (1966) (education was left solely to parents
in colonial America); see also Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 Ill. 303, 7 N.E. 262 (1887) (in a suit
to gain admittance of a child to public school, it was held that the parent's command that the child
not study grammar, resulting in child's failure of proficiency examinations in that course, provided
no basis for excluding child from public school). These authorities and others are discussed more
extensively in Note, supra note 1, at 191-93. See also S. BLUMENFELD, NEA: TROJAN HORSE IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 1-39 (Public education as a norm for children rather than an available
option to parents was a usurpation of the traditional parental prerogative in early America.). The
common law recognized a parental right to control the educational and social aspects of a child's
development. See Note, supra note 2, at 359.
173. See Note, supra note 2, at 359
174. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (elaborate review procedures are not necessary
when parents commit children to a psychiatric facility because parents are rebuttably presumed to
know and act upon the best interests of their children); Developments in the Law--The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1354 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
For a discussion of parental authority to make decisions for the child, see Stocklin-Enright, supra
note 4, at 581-86. For cases on parental autonomy involving the due process clause, see id. at 567
n.19. For discussions of cases involving the right to family privacy, see Devins, supra note 1, at 445-
56 n.70, 446-47 n.72. See also Note, supra note 1, at 204 ("Historically, the compelling state interest
in education has been not so much the welfare of the individual child as the welfare of the collective
state.").
For a discussion of the proposition that a child has the right to make his or her educational
choices, see Note, supra note 2, at 373-74.
175. The constitutionality of laws regulating child labor was upheld in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1972).
176. As one court has observed:
The question here, of course, is not whether the socialization provided in the school is
beneficial to a child, but rather, who should make that decision for any particular child.
Under our system, the parent must be allowed to decide whether public school education,
including its socialization aspects, is desirable or undesirable for children.
Perchemlides v. Frizzle, No. 16641, slip op. at 13 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 1978); see also Garvey,
Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51
S. CAL. L. REv. 769, 806 (1978) (discussing a parent's interest in "living one's life through one's
children, [which] might be called the parent's right to exercise his religion through the child, and to
extend through the child ideas, language, and customs which the parent believes to be important").
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bly intertwined with our society's emphasis on personal liberty, family integrity,
and societal diversity. Allowing a parent to control his or her child's upbring-
ing, except when parental control undeniably harms the child, guards against
the danger of state indoctrination.177 Many parents fear that "the state, if left to
its own devices, will create a monolithic educational creature that will stamp out
societal diversity."' 178 Indeed, as schools move beyond the teaching of tradi-
tional subjects to such controversial subjects as evolution, 17 9 value free sex edu-
cation,180 "moral values education,"''1 and politics,' 8 2 sometimes employing
177. See Developments in the Law, supra note 174, at 1354.
178. Devins, supra note 1, at 438.
179. Although evolution is generally taught as if it were an established scientific fact, it is merely
a theory that has been convincingly challenged by many learned scientists. See, eg., H. MORRIS,
EVOLUTION IN TURMOIL (1982); A. WILDER-SMITH, MAN'S ORIGIN, MAN'S DESTINY (1975). Cre-
ation theory is not simply a religious position; it can be scientifically expounded without reliance on
the Bible. See, eg., A. WILDER-SMITH, THE CREATION Or LIFE: A CYBERNETIC APPROACH TO
EVOLUTION (1970); A. WILDER-SMITH, THE NATURAL SCIENCES KNOW NOTHING OF EVOLU-
TION (1981). It is hardly surprising that the teaching of evolution as fact without serious reference
to the theory of creation would deeply disturb many parents, because the theory of evolution not
only can instill a scientific opinion but, more significantly, may inculcate a quasi-religious world
view. Before creation scientists entered the debate,
[i]n the world of secular education, evolutionary philosophy was not only dominant in
biology teaching, but throughout the whole curriculum. The natural sciences were based
on evolutionary naturalism, the social sciences emphasized evolutionary socialism, the hu-
manities stressed evolutionary humanism, and even the business and technology courses
imbued a spirit of evolutionary materialism.
H. MORRIS, supra, at 114.
For a discussion of the impact of the evolution philosophy on public education, see S. BLUMEN-
FELD, supra note 172, at 40-48 (1985).
180. Parents may legitimately object to birth control information being given to their children.
K. Gow, YES, VIRGINIA, THERE IS RIGHT AND WRONG 197-98 (1985). It has been argued that the
effect of sex education courses as they are frequently conducted is to encourage or even pressure
children to have extramarital sexual relations and to advance the view that all forms of sexual prac-
tice and familial arrangements are equally acceptable. See id. at 109-14. Furthermore, the rationale
for sex education that goes beyond biological information is based less and less upon the need to
prevent teenage pregnancy and venereal disease; it is admitted by some educational leaders that the
effect of sex education on these problems is negligible and that the real purpose of sex education is to
prepare children to have sexual relationships. See id. at 112-14. Also, sex education as imparted
may actually minimize dangers such as venereal disease in a student's mind. See id. For examples of
"moral values exercises" which promote relativity of values concerning sexual-issues and which are
commonly used in public schools, see id. at 42-44, 61-62, 188-89. For a discussion of moral values
education, which takes a value-neutral approach to all moral issues, see infra note 181 (Many par-
ents would find the "moral values education" commonly imparted in public schools to be a form of
indoctrination in the philosophy of moral relativism.).
181. The moral values education conducted in public schools today is widely perceived as in-
struction in a dogma of moral relativism or secular humanism, the very opposite of the neutral or
pluralistic perspective it purports to be. K. Gow, supra note 180, at 164-82; see also S. BLUMEN-
FELD, supra note 172, at 225-40 (discussing growth of humanistic curriculum in schools). The three
main approaches to moral values education are values clarification, moral reasoning, and the reflec-
tive approach. K. Gow, supra note 180, at 16. All three approaches are widely'viewed as relativis-
tic, and values clarification is the most popular approach. Id. at 225. For discussions of values
clarification, see Bennett & Dellattre, Moral Education in the Schools, 50 PuB. INTEREST 81-98
(1978); Oldenquist, Moral Education Without Moral Education, 49 HARV. EDUC. REV. 240, 247
(1979).
The Supreme Court has noted that a state may not impose "'a religion of secularism' in the
sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 225 (1963). See Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 3, at 49-42 (discussing state promotion of the
religion of secular humanism). Because moral values education is not limited to public education,
prohibition of home instruction when no other alternative to moral indoctrination exists would
greatly impinge on an objecting parent's religious liberty. Parental removal of children from certain
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psychological techniques many consider extremely dangerous, '8 3 the possibility
of state indoctrination increases enormously, making imperative the preserva-
tion of the home instruction alternative.
184
school activities to avoid moral values education is not a viable option, because moral values educa-
tion is designed to be an integral part of the entire school curriculum. K. Gow, supra note 180, at
107. Besides violating parental perogatives to govern children's moral upbringing, moral values
education approaches are considered by many to be very hazardous to the psychological and emo-
tional health of children. See infra note 183.
Sometimes, pupils are admonished not to discuss the moral education they receive with their
parents, and parents "have been either implicitly or explicitly discouraged from examining contro-
versial classroom materials .... One would hope that this does not happen frequently, but the fact
that it is documented ... is alarming." K. Gow, supra note 180, at 187. Gow points out that some
moral values education leaders advise teachers to engage in subterfuge to evade parental objections.
Id. at 195-98 (discussing H. KIRSHENBERG, ADVANCED VALUES CLARIFICATION (1977)).
The General Education Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(a) (Supp. 1985), provides that in
federally assisted educational programs, instructional materials "designed to explore or develop new
or unproven teaching methods or techniques" must be made available for parental inspection. Id.
Complaints brought under this statute are governed by 34 C.F.R. § 98 (1985). See also infra note
183 (psychological practices in public schools and applicable federal law). These laws, however, are
not widely known and are seldom used by dissenting parents. K. Gow, supra note 180, at 156. For
a discussion of these and other laws pertaining to family rights, see id. at 153-61. For a sample form
letter parents might use to prevent objectionable moral and political instruction of their children and
a list of educational practices to which parents might legitimately object, see Please Excuse Johnny
from Death Ed, HARPER'S, May 1985, at 24 (text of material distributed by Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle
Forum of Alton, Illinois). See also CHILD ABUSE IN THE CLASSROOM (P. Schlafly ed. 1985) (ex-
cerpts from testimony given by parents and teachers in United States Department of Education
Hearings on the General Education Provisions Act).
182. See, eg., M. GABLER & N. GABLER, supra note 4 (discussing lack of balanced information
in education); Brooks, Back to School, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Oct. 1985, at 321 (discussing
the use of "simulations" of past decisions by political leaders in a history class); Kamenshine, The
First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1134 (1979)
(discussing claim of some school officials that promoting certain political values furthers a societal
interest).
183. See, eg., K. Gow, supra note 180, at 33-49 (discussing various moral values education
exercises for students, such as the "life raft" exercise in which students pretend they are deciding
which member of the group must perish so that the others may live, based on a group assessment of
the worth of each individual). Dr. Gow observes:
In the late 1960s many adults learned from painful experience that to take part in sensitiv-
ity training and encounter groups led by untrained people can be disastrous. Literally
thousands of people laid themselves open to enormous psycho-social damage. Recognizing
this, many are concerned that now, in the name of values education, the same techniques
are being applied to children in the classroom, often without parents' knowledge and
consent.
Id. at 49.
Another disturbing aspect of this practice of amateur psychology in public schools is that stu-
dents are often required to disclose details about their inner thoughts or family life. For example,
one moral values education technique is for a teacher to interview a student about intimate matters
before the class. Id. at 45-49. This threat to a student's privacy is compounded by the fact schools
might keep records of responses to such probings along with the teacher's subjective evaluation of
their significance. Id. at 198-201. Under federal law, students may not be required to submit to
psychological programs whose primary purpose is to extract such information. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232h(b) (Supp. 1985). Procedures for bringing complaints for violations of this statute are set
forth in 34 C.F.R. § 99 (1985). See also supra note 181 (discussing similar laws). General family
privacy rights are protected by 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (1985).
184. See J. WHITEHEAD, THE NEW TYRANNY 3 (1982). Stephen Arons opines that public
schools inculcate certain values in children, including:
1. Authority in society should be organized hierarchically, and it is appropriate for
those of less authority to cultivate attributes of obedience and passivity.
2. Truth is prescribed and established by authority and learning means understand-
ing and accepting the official version of reality.
3. Material acquisition, rather than spiritual condition, is the most significant mea-
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Private schools provide no acceptable alternative to parents who wish to
instill their own values in their children1 85 if, like the Delcontes, 186 these parents.
either do not agree with the values taught at private schools or cannot afford
private schools. Although some public educators argue that public education
allows children to be exposed to different values so that they may choose values
for themselves, 187 this justification undermines parental autonomy. Exposure to
a multitude of values may leave children confused and valueless, rendering them
susceptible to peer-created values rather than eager to explore or redefine their
own values.
188
To avoid the dangers of state indoctrination and preserve the diversity in
society that results from children learning values from their own families, the
North Carolina Supreme Court should recognize a right to home education
guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution. The right is far too important
sure of personal success and social progress; and measurement, rather than intuition, de-
fines knowledge.
4. Competition is more important than cooperation.
5. The ability to follow directions is more important than creativity, and dissent is
either the result of poor communication, willful misanthropy, or emotional instability.
6. Poverty, malnutrition, disease, oppression, and violence are not created by anyone
who lives regarding the society's rules, and people in general should perform whatever acts
are required by their roles without ethical discomfort.
7. Compulsion and coercion are acceptable means of creating proper behavior in-
cluding learning.
8. There are specific character attributes associated with race, gender, class and age
that cannot be changed and upon which may be based the distribution of power, wealth,
and dignity.
9. Institutional schooling contributes to the progress of the individual and society,
upgrades general morality, reduces prejudice, and protects each rising generation from the
mistakes of the previous generation.
10. Manual labor can never attain the dignity or power of intellectual labor; and art,
music and mysticism are nonessential.
S. ARONS, supra note 5, at 100-101.
185. "In court, Christian educators and parents argue that state efforts to limit or prohibit home
instruction deprive them of their liberty to freely carry out their religious mission in the form of
Christian education ... ' Devins, supra note 1, at 439 (quoting Bangor Baptist Church v. State,
549 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (D. Me. 1982) (citing plaintiff's petition)); see also Duro v. District Attor-
ney, 712 F.2d 96, 97 (4th Cir. 1983) (Plaintiff removed his children from school to avoid the influ-
ence of the "unisex movement" and secular humanism.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); State v.
Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Iowa 1981) (defendants claimed that prohibiting home instruction
violated their free exercise rights); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980) (defendants claimed
that law requiring compulsory attendance at public or approved private school violated free exercise
right). But see State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359, 366 (W. Va. 1981) ("[It is] inconceivable that in the
twentieth century the free exercise clause ... implies that children can lawfully be sequestered on a
rural homestead during all of their formative years .... "). State indoctrination, however, differs not
only from some single set of values called "Christian," but also from other sets of values held by
parents who choose alternatives to public education.
186. Record at 42, Delconte, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 898.
187. See supra note 167.
188. See K. Gow, supra note 180, at 107-09. Another reason parents may value the right of
home education is that there is now a growing movement to require formal schooling for children of
kindergarten age and younger. See Fiske, Early Schooling Is Now the Rage, N.Y. Times, April 13,
1986, § 12 (Magazine), at 24. Whatever the merits of early academic instruction, requiring removal
of a child from the home before the age of six invades parental autonomy significantly. Should the
North Carolina General Assembly ever require pre-school instruction, the preservation of the home
study option would at least provide parents with the opportunity to keep their children at home
during these early formative years.
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to be left to legislation. It would be quite easy in the future for advocates of
exclusively institutional education to find an isolated incident of inadequate
home education and create a furor over North Carolina's "backward" educa-
tional statutes, leading to legislative preclusion of the home study option in
North Carolina. The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction is al-
ready arguing for the enactment of serious restraints on parents who educate
their children at home. Admitting that most educators desire "legislation to
prohibit home instruction altogether as a substitute for public school attend-
ance,"189 the Department notes that the "far right" 190 could "make such legisla-
tion difficult to pass."' 191 Therefore, the Department offers a series of
restrictions on home schools, including the requirement that a home-instructing
parent have a college degree. 192 Furthermore, the Department proposes a "re-
quired standard course of study,"' 9 3 which potentially could impose on children
ideas and values that have prompted some dissenting parents to remove their
children from public school.
In their treatments of the North Carolina constitutional issues raised in
Delconte, neither the court of appeals 194 nor the supreme court1 95 mentioned the
North Carolina Constitution's right of conscience provision 196 upon which the
policy statement of the deregulatory statute pertaining to religious schools 197 is
based. The North Carolina Constitution guarantees citizens a "right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences" 198 and de-
clares that the right of conscience shall not be interfered with "in any case
whatever."199
One North Carolina case, In re Williams,2 00 suggests that the religious free-
dom guarantees of the North Carolina Constitution are coextensive with the
rights protected by the federal constitution's free exercise clause. In Williams a
minister argued that his refusal to testify for either the state or the defense in the
189. Peek, Home Instruction and the Compulsory Attendance Act, School Management Advi-
sor, Series 3, at 3 (1986) (available from the North Carolina Dept. of Public Instruction, Education
Bldg., Raleigh, N.C., 27603-1712).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2.
193. Id
194. Delconte, 65 N.C. App. 267-68, 308 S.E.2d 903.
195. Delconte, 313 N.C. at 400-01, 329 S.E.2d at 646-47. The Christian Legal Society argued
before the supreme court that the North Carolina Constitution guarantees parents the right to home
education. Amicus Curiae Brief [Christian Legal Society] at 12-14, Delconte.
196. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-547 (1983). The Kentucky Constitution includes parental educa-
tional rights in its "conscience clause." KY CONST. § 5. See Board of Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d
877 (Ky. 1979) (construing the Kentucky provision), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); see also
Lines, supra note 1, at 211 (brief discussion of this provision).
Some state constitutions require that the state have some form of compulsory education. See
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 11; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 3; OKLA. CONST.
art. XIII, § 4; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
198. N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 13.
199. Id.
200. 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967) (construing N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26, amended 1946)
cerL denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967). Article I, § 26 is currently codified at N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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rape trial of a member of his congregation was protected under the North Caro-
lina Constitution and the United States Constitution.20 1 The court held that a
minister called as a witness to a crime could be compelled to testify despite these
guarantees of religious freedom. 20 2 It also held that the protections of North
Carolina's conscience clause are not limited to members of organized religious
bodies.20 3 In addition, the court stated that the conscience clause guarantee "is
no more extensive than the freedom to exercise one's religion, which is protected
by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' '2° 4 Conse-
quently, the conscience clause does not protect a person's sense of ethics, 20 5 and
a genuine religious belief may be infringed if it is necessary to effect a "compel-
ling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate. ' 20 6 As an illustration, the court quoted a passage from
Prince v. Massachusetts,20 7 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
states may require school attendance, regulate child labor, and restrict parents'
control "'in many other ways.' "208
Although Williams may suggest that the recent decision in Duro on the
federal free exercise clause defines the limits of North Carolina's conscience
clause protection for home educators, there are two reasons to reject this analy-
sis. First, it is doubtful that the Williams court really ceded the power to define
the guarantees of North Carolina's conscience clause to the federal courts.
States are generally free to extend greater protection of basic rights to their citi-
zens than the federal constitution guarantees. 20 9 Second, in the later case of
Heritage Village Church v. State2 10 the North Carolina Supreme Court noted
that the free exercise clause and the North Carolina conscience clause, together
with North Carolina's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion,
2 11
201. 269 N.C. at 73, 152 S.E.2d at 321.
"202. Id. at 81, 152 S.E.2d at 327.
203. Id. at 78, 152 S.E.2d at 325. This interpretation refutes the North Carolina School Boards
Association's argument that the provisions of the statute deregulating schools of religious charter are
limited to organized religious groups. See Amicus Curiae Brief [North Carolina School Boards
Assn.] at 3, Delconte. Because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-547 (1983) is based upon the conscience
clause, the provisions are designed to foster religious freedom. Thus, the argument of the State that
the deregulation provisions only apply to educational institutions, New Brief for the State at 21,
Delconte, is also contrary to the Williams interpretation of the conscience clause. Williams extends
religious guarantees to unorganized as well as organized religious groups.
204. Williams, 269 N.C. at 78, 152 S.E.2d at 325.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 80, 152 S.E.2d at 326 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
207. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
208. Williams, 269 N.C. at 79, 152 S.E.2d at 326 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944)). For a brief discussion of Williams, see Pollitt & Strong, Constitutional Law, 45
N.C.L. Rnv. 855, 862-64 (1967); see also State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (state may
prohibit handling of poisonous snakes over religious liberty objections of members of a religious
sect), appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 942 (1979).
209. See, eg., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (recognizing that "independent and ade-
quate" state grounds in a search and seizure case might provide greater procedural protection to
criminal defendants than the fourth amendment, but requiring a clear statement by a state court that
its decision rested independently on that state's constitution).
210. 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980).
211. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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"coalesce into a singular guarantee of freedom of religious profession and wor-
ship." 21 2 The court invalidated an act that required submission of reports on
charitable solicitations from churches that received financial support primarily
from nonmembers, but did not require such reports from churches that received
support mainly from members.21 3 The court noted that the act had a valid secu-
lar purpose in protecting the public from fraud,2 14 but held that it violated the
North Carolina Constitution not only because it involved excessive entangle-
ment of government with religion and interference with the rights of con-
science,215 but also because it treated religious organizations unequally.
2 16 If
treating churches that receive support primarily from nonmembers differently
from those that are mainly supported by their own members constitutes religious
discrimination, then it would also violate the North Carolina Constitution to
place restrictions on religious parents who wish to educate their children at
home than on those who enroll their children in private institutional schools.
This discrimination would be particularly offensive to those parents who, like
the Delcontes, 2 17 do not share the religious views of a religious institutional
school. 2 18 Heritage Village thus provides a clearer exposition of North Carolina
religious freedom guarantees than Williams.
The North Carolina Constitution, however, apparently allows home educa-
tion without a showing that religious belief has been infringed. Article IX, sec-
tion 3 provides that every child of appropriate age and physical and mental
ability shall attend public schools "unless educated by other means."
'2 19
Although the state has the duty "to guard and maintain" 220 the privilege of
education, this does not mean that the "other means" by which children may be
educated must be those expressly permitted by the general assembly. If these
constitutional provisions were interpreted otherwise, the general assembly would
be empowered to foreclose home education options including those that are de-
monstrably better than public schools. 221 Additionally, the "other means" pro-
vision implies that guarding and maintaining the privilege of education involves
the protection of parental educational prerogatives as well as ensuring that chil-
dren are educated in some fashion. Allowing parents to choose the home in-
struction option while requiring achievement testing protects the interests of
212. Heritage Village, 299 N.C. at 406, 263 S.E.2d at 730.
213. Id. at 405, 263 S.E.2d at 729.
214. Id. at 408, 263 S.E.2d at 731.
215. Id. at 416, 263 S.E.2d at 736.
216. Id. at 413-14, 263 S.E.2d at 734-35.
217. Record at 42, Delconte.
218. Yet another reason to think that the religious clauses provide religious parents a right to
educate their children at home is a provision of the North Carolina Constitution that provides that
the state shall "encourage" schools, libraries, and the means of education because "religion, moral-
ity, and knowledge" are "necessary to good government." N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Although
imparting religion in public schools is now prohibited by federal constitutional law, see, e.g., Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding state-sponsored prayer in public schools unconstitutional), the
state would actually be inhibiting the general religion "necessary to good government" by constrict-
ing the religious bases for private education.
219. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
220. Id. art. I, § 15.
221. New Brief for the State at 19-20, Delconte.
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both parent and child in the privilege of education. 2 22
When parental authority and family autonomy are curbed to implement the
laudable goal of educating children, the vast majority of citizens readily accepts
a great degree of state supervision of education. However, the danger of state
indoctrination, either actual or potential militates against placing significant bur-
dens on the home instruction option. The North Carolina compulsory educa-
tion statutes provide enough state supervision to ensure that children receive an
adequate education without creating any significant restriction on parents' rights
to direct the moral, ideological, and religious upbringing of their children. The
supreme court's holding in Delconte recognizes that the educational statutes al-
low home instruction. The court should rule that the educational provisions and
the conscience clause of the North Carolina Constitution also guarantee the
right to home instruction.
EDWARD KNOX PROCTOR V
222. Assuming religious parents have the right to educate their children at home, equal protec-
tion of the laws under N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 would probably protect nonreligious parents as well.
See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text; cf United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights § 26(3) ("[P]arents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given their
children.").
For an early philosophical defense of the right to home education with standardized testing as a
safeguard against inadequacy, see J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 103-06 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978). Mill was
home educated. See Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant [The Rutherford Institute] at 8,
Delconte.
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